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Washington University
Journal of Law & Policy
Access to Justice: Evolving Standards in
Juvenile Justice: From Gault to Graham
and Beyond
Introduction
Mae C. Quinn
As suggested by the title of this symposium, the juvenile justice
system is in flux. This state of transformation is nothing new,
however. It is a process that has been in progress for over one
hundred years. It is one that is likely to continue. And it is the topic
explored in this volume by leading youth advocate-scholars who,
collectively, have spent over one hundred years representing young
people in juvenile courts and through law school clinical programs
across the country.1
This collection of articles explores the ongoing evolution of
juvenile justice standards, sharing important theoretical insights about
the current state of the law as well as experience-based lessons from
committed juvenile practitioners who confront important youth
justice issues in our communities and courts. It is being published in
conjunction with Washington University‘s 12th annual Access to

Professor of Law and Co-Director, Civil Justice Clinic—Juvenile Rights and Re-Entry
Project (JR-REP), Washington University School of Law.
1. These advocate-scholars are as follows: Kristin Henning, Tamar Birckhead, Randy
Hertz, and Martin Guggenheim, Lourdes Rosado, Kim McLaurin, and Sandra Simkins and Lisa
Geis (with Dr. Marty Beyer) (in order of appearance in this issue).

1
Washington University Open Scholarship

2

Journal of Law & Policy

[Vol. 38:1

Equal Justice Colloquium, which this year sought to bring together
stakeholders from the national, state, and local levels to share and
build juvenile justice expertise during a day-long conference.2 Our
goal was to consider where we have been, where we are now, and
where we might go in the future to ensure the delivery of substantive
justice for vulnerable youth, with some emphasis on the particular
challenges presented by Missouri‘s juvenile justice system.
Most juvenile law scholars agree that the juvenile justice
movement began during the Progressive Era, where reformers called
upon the state as parens patriae to protect wayward children rather
than punish them like adults.3 Typical of the sentiments of the day, in
1898, one child advocate declared:
We make criminals out of children who are not criminals
by treating them as if they were criminals. That ought to be
stopped. What we should have, in our system of criminal
jurisprudence, is an entirely separate systems of courts for
children . . . who commit offenses which would be criminal in
adults. We ought to have a ―children‘s court‖ . . . and we ought
to have a ―children‘s judge,‖ who should attend to no other
business. We want some place of detention for those children
other than a prison.4

2. The event was sponsored by the Washington University Clinical Legal Education
programs and organized by the Juvenile Rights and Re-Entry Project. Other sponsors and
supporters include the Office of the Missouri the State Public Defender, the National Juvenile
Defense Center, and the Gephardt Institute for Public Service. Numerous individuals also
deserve thanks for helping to organize this important event, including: Katie Herr, Clinical
Programs Manager; Kathryn Pierce, JR-REP Lecturer-in-Law and Supervising Attorney; and
Katie Harrington and Jake Peterson, Editor-in-Chief and Managing Editor of this Journal. I am
also grateful to our Fall 2011 JR-REP student attorneys Alexandra Appatova, Eric Buske,
Molly Carney, Paul Cotter, Anthony Davidson, Christopher Hamilton, David Huddleston,
James McFall, Hani Mirza, Hung Ou Yang, J. Benjamin Rosebrough, and William Waller for
their hard work, zealous advocacy on behalf of young people, and brilliant teaching, which
helped inspire the issues addressed at this Colloquium.
3. DAVID S. TANENHAUS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN: IN RE GAULT
AND JUVENILE JUSTICE 4 (2011) (describing parens patriae as ―the paternalistic idea of the state
as a father‖).
4. ANTHONY M. PLATT, THE CHILD SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY 132
(40th Anniversary ed. 2009) (quoting Frederick Wines, Proceedings of the Illinois Conference
of Charities (1898)).
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Heeding calls like these, efforts to employ new approaches in
youth justice spread in the form of specialized juvenile courts. The
first such institution, established in Chicago, Illinois in 1899, came to
serve as a national model.5 Under this framework, young people were
to be excluded from the traditional criminal justice system and
instead were to receive individualized treatment in a more
rehabilitative and less legalistic setting.6 The focus of this first wave
of courts was described by Judge Julian Mack:
The problem for determination by the judge is not, Has this
boy or girl committed a specific wrong, but What is he, how
has he become what he is, and what had best be done in his
interest and in the interest of the state to save him from a
downward career.7
Thus the status and condition of the youth, rather than their specific
behavior, called for state intervention. Judge Mack continued, ―It is
apparent at once that the ordinary legal evidence in a criminal court is
not the sort of evidence to be heard in such a proceeding.‖8 Instead, a
―thorough investigation, usually made by the probation officer,‖ was
more important, ―giv[ing] the court much information bearing on the
heredity and environment of the child.‖9
Probation investigations spanned the domain of the ―psychophysical,‖ including data about the child‘s mental, physical, and
emotional condition, which might provide clues for the court about
how to best ―change . . . [his or her] character.‖10 Indeed, borrowing
from the medical model, advocates of the juvenile court model
believed it should serve as a ―palliative‖ and ―curative‖ institution
rather than a court of law.11 Thus, treatment intervention through
informality took hold in juvenile courts during the first half of the
last century.12 Missouri established its first such court in 1903.13
5. TANENHAUS, supra note 3, at 4.
6. Id.
7. Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 119–20 (1909).
8. Id. at 120.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 122; see also PLATT, supra note 4, at 142 (―The role model for juvenile court
judges was doctor-counselor.‖).
12. See, e.g., Cinque v. Boyd, 121 A. 678 (Conn. 1923) (describing the juvenile court

Washington University Open Scholarship

4

Journal of Law & Policy

[Vol. 38:1

But as Paul W. Tappan, a contemporary commentator and scholar,
observed at the time:
Despite the wide extension of a humanitarian philosophy in the
child-welfare movement during the twentieth century, the
treatment of the delinquent reflects a serious confusion of
methods and purposes. The greatest difficulty lies in the huge
gap between ideals and reality, between the realm of thought
about and action toward the delinquent. It frequently appears
that what most people say about the child (expressing the most
benevolent intentions) has utterly no relation to what they do.
Often neither what they say or do is very realistic in relation to
the child‘s behavior and his needs.14
Tappan described a system where young people accused of a widerange of alleged wrongdoings—some acts mere youthful
indiscretions not even prohibited by the criminal code—were
committed to out-of-home placements such as detention centers or
residential programs.15 These facilities were run by some of the same
rigid rules and offered the same kind of harsh environment as adult
jails and prisons.16
If not so committed, such youth often were placed on probation
supervision for indefinite periods of ―adjustment‖ time to be
monitored and corrected.17 Dispositions such as these were handed
down without accused children being aided by the assistance of
counsel and frequently without any formal finding of guilt.18 Tappan
movement as it unfolded, collecting cases from around the country upholding the establishment
of state juvenile court systems); see also DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS, A VERY SPECIAL PLACE IN
LIFE: THE HISTORY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE IN MISSOURI (2003) (describing the evolution of
juvenile justice practices in the state of Missouri).
13. ABRAMS, supra note 12, at 45–46.
14. Paul W. Tappan, Prevention and Treatment of Delinquency, in SOCIAL PROBLEMS 235
(1950). Tappan was a New York University sociology and law professor who spent decades
studying the workings of lower courts, including juvenile and wayward minors‘ courts. See id.;
see also, e.g., PAUL TAPPAN, DELINQUENT GIRLS IN COURT: A STUDY OF THE WAYWARD
MINOR COURT OF NEW YORK (1947); PAUL TAPPAN, CRIME, JUSTICE AND CORRECTION
(1960).
15. Tappan, Treatment of Delinquency, supra note 14, at 236–40.
16. Id. at 236–40.
17. Id. at 246–59.
18. Id. at 238–40.
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argued that the efficacy of these interventions, delivered by many
who were untrained in the fields of mental health or psychology,
offered questionable results.19 Thus, although clearly well-intended,
these localized innovations came to be seen by many as lacking fair
processes, unduly paternalistic, and vulnerable to abuses of
discretion.20
Others, too, saw the emerging model as dangerous in its threat to
the autonomy of impacted adolescents. Leading juvenile court critic
Anthony Platt saw the institution‘s practices as not only class-based
and condescending but also part of a state-run system of control that
discounted vulnerable populations and virtually erased their
personhood:
The benevolent philosophy of the juvenile court often
disguises the fact that the offender is regarded as a ―nonperson‖ who is immature, unworldly, and incapable of making
effective decisions with regard to his own welfare and future.
Genuine attention is rarely paid to how the offender feels and
experiences his predicament; . . . the present structural
arrangement of the juvenile court is likely to invite regression
and diminish self-respect in its ―clients.‖21
More than this, not all youth who faced charges were provided with
the option of juvenile court. Through their juvenile codes, individual
states established various, sometimes conflicting, criteria that would
exclude certain youth from juvenile courts‘ purported protective
embrace. These included disparate jurisdictional age cut-offs,
statutory exclusion of certain serious crimes, and discretionary
rejection of children who appeared to be beyond reform.22 In 1954,
19. Id. at 262–76.
20. See generally id.; PLATT, supra note 4.
21. PLATT, supra note 4, at 160.
22. See, e.g., People v. Roper, 181 N.E. 88, 90–92 (N.Y. 1932) (explaining that in the
1930s, New York youth charged with serious crimes such as first degree murder were not
covered by the jurisdiction of juvenile court); State v. Monahan, 104 A.2d 21 (N.J. 1954)
(describing how during the 1940s and 1950s, half the states vested juvenile courts with
exclusive jurisdiction for youth under sixteen years of age); Kent v. U.S., 383 U.S. 541 (1966)
(describing D.C. Code sec. 11-914, which allowed for judicial waiver after ―full investigation‖
of any youth charged with any act that would be a felony if committed by an adult).
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the New Jersey Supreme Court offered a sketch of the wide-range of
approaches:
There remain . . . strongly conflicting opinions as to how
juveniles should be dealt with in cases involving homicide and
other heinous misconduct. Some . . . fail to suggest any
alternative except, perhaps, the return to the barbarous days
when eight and ten-year-old boys and a 13-year-old girl were
tried and executed for arson and murder.23
It went on:
Others take the view that although the juvenile court
movement is soundly based and should be strengthened, it
should nevertheless be confined to non-heinous offenses, at
least when older children are concerned; in other words, errant
children should receive supervision and correction but only so
long as they have not erred too greatly. Still others, however,
urge both the strengthening and widening of the juvenile court
movement, pointing out that the grossness of the child's
misconduct intensifies rather than lessens the need for
corrective supervision under the jurisdiction of a specialist
judge, empowered to protect fully both the interests of the
child and the public at large.24
Thus, despite the country‘s alleged new orientation towards treating
juveniles as a class different from adults,25 there was no clear
consensus around which young people were worthy of juvenile court
treatment or how that decision should be made. Countless youths
therefore found themselves ushered into criminal courts to face harsh
adult sentences during this period—some executed as a result.26
23. Monahan, 104 A.2d at 27.
24. Id.
25. Janet E. Ainsworth, Re-Imagining Childhood and Reconstructing the Legal Order:
The Case for Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C.L. REV. 1083, 1097 (1991) (―[T]he
Progressives fashioned a discrete juvenile justice system premised upon the belief that, like
other children, adolescents are not morally accountable for their behavior.‖).
26. See Roper, 181 N.E. at 92 (noting that a child convicted of first-degree murder, with a
sufficiently guilty mind and specific intentionality, could receive the death penalty in New York
in 1932); see also Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 832 (1988) (citing to the research of
Professor Victor Streib, which suggests that between eighteen and twenty juvenile were
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By the 1960s, questions and concerns about juvenile procedures
and practices across the country mounted. In what might be seen as
the second wave in the juvenile court movement, a new generation of
youth advocates—those steeped in the teachings of the so-called due
process revolution of that era—pressed for further reform in two
cases before the Supreme Court.27
First, in 1966, attorneys for Morris Kent, a sixteen-year-old boy
who had been transferred from the District of Columbia juvenile
court system into the adult system where he faced the possibility of
the death penalty for the crime of rape,28 took his case to the Supreme
Court.29 It was the first juvenile justice matter the high court heard.30
Kent‘s waiver to criminal court took place under a District of
Columbia statute which allowed such discretionary determinations to
be made by the judge upon ―full investigation‖ of any youth facing
felony charges.31 The investigation in Kent‘s case apparently took
place off the record, behind closed doors, without input from Kent or
his lawyer, in an ex parte exchange with juvenile court staff.32
Kent‘s attorneys argued that the certification order was unlawful
because, among other things, ―no hearing was held; because no
findings were made by the Juvenile Court; because the Juvenile
Court stated no reasons for waiver; and because counsel was denied
access to the Social Service file which presumably was considered by
the Juvenile Court in determining to waive jurisdiction.‖33
The Court agreed and remanded for certification review. In doing
so Justice Abe Fortas, writing for the Court‘s majority, joined the
chorus of critics dubious of the fluid nature of juvenile court
executed during the first half of the last century—the same period as the first wave of the
juvenile court movement).
27. See TANENHAUS, supra note 3, at 53 (―From the perspective of younger lawyers at the
forefront of the 1960‘s due process revolution, the juvenile court was a suspect institution.‖).
28. Id. At the time, rape was still a death-eligible crime. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S.
583 (1977) (barring execution for the crime of rape as cruel and unusual punishment). At trial,
Kent was acquitted of rape based on grounds of insanity but convicted of burglary and robbery.
Kent, 383 U.S. 541, 550 (1966). He was sentenced to an indeterminate term of thirty to ninety
years imprisonment. Id.
29. Id. at 541.
30. See TANENHAUS, supra note 3, at 54.
31. Id.
32. Kent, 383 U.S at 547.
33. Id. at 552.
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proceedings. He quipped that while juvenile courts were
―theoretically engaged in determining the needs of the child and of
society rather than adjudicating criminal conduct,‖ ―the admonition
to function in a ‗parental‘ relationship is not an invitation to
procedural arbitrariness.‖34 He went on to hold that given the
critically important nature of certification proceedings, they needed
to comport with due process.35 Thus, juveniles must at least be
provided with access to the social file and other evidence to be
considered by the court, a hearing, express findings supporting the
waiver decision, and representation throughout by counsel.36
As for the role of counsel, the Court noted that while juvenile court
proceedings might be informal, they should not become a ―mockery‖
by preventing counsel from functioning as effective advocates.37 In
case there was any doubt, Justice Fortas underscored the important
role of juvenile defense counsel: ―The right to representation by
counsel is not a formality. It is not a grudging gesture to a ritualistic
requirement. It is of the essence of justice.‖38
Interestingly, the parties did not raise, nor did the Court address,
the legitimacy of sentencing adolescents to harsh adult criminal
sentences—an issue at least presented by the facts of Kent‘s case.39
Rather than establishing substantive limits on treating young people
like adult offenders, the matter was simply handled on procedural
grounds. But while it was beyond the facts of Kent‘s case, Justice
Fortas suggested that juveniles whose cases were resolved in juvenile
court might have similarly viable procedural claims:
While there can be no doubt of the original laudable purpose of
juvenile courts, studies and critiques in recent years raise
serious questions as to whether actual performance measures
well enough against theoretical purpose to make tolerable the
immunity of the process from the reach of constitutional
guaranties applicable to adults. There is much evidence that
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. at 554–55.
Id. at 560–62.
Id. at 547.
Id. at 561.
Id. at 561–62.
See generally id.
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some juvenile courts . . . lack the personnel, facilities and
techniques to perform adequately as representatives of the
State in a parens patriae capacity, at least with respect to
children charged with law violation. There is evidence, in fact,
that there may be grounds for concern that the child receives
the worst of both worlds: that he gets neither the protections
accorded to adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative
treatment postulated for children.40
With this pronouncement, Justice Fortas teed up the constitutional
challenges of Gerald Gault, whose case was heard the following
term.41 Not unlike the scene painted by Tappan in his more general
critique of juvenile court practices, fifteen-year-old Gault had been
sent away to a reformatory until the age of twenty-one for allegedly
making lewd telephone calls to his neighbor.42 Gault and his family
were not provided with legal representation or advance notice of the
specific legal charges.43 Instead, they were brought in for a hearing
conducted in chambers at which no evidence was presented against
Gault, nor was he given an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses
against him.44 Yet, Gault was required to respond to questioning by
the judge about the alleged call, during which he incriminated
himself in at least one fact concerning who dialed the telephone.45
Arizona law also provided no right to appeal in juvenile
delinquency matters or transcript of the proceedings.46 Nevertheless,
Gault sought review of his commitment to the State Industrial School
by way of writ of habeas corpus.47 After the writ was denied, Gault‘s
legal team took the case to the Supreme Court.48 Again, Justice
Fortas offered a biting critique of the arbitrary and ad hoc
mechanisms that had emerged in juvenile courts in disrespect of an
entire class of persons—youth. In an oft-quoted line he asserted,
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. at 556.
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); see also TANENHAUS, supra note 3, at 53–56.
Gault, 387 U.S. at 4-10.
Id. at 4–7.
Id.
Id. at 6–8, 43–44.
Id. at 8, 57–58.
Id. at 8–10.
Id.
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―Under our Constitution, the condition of being a boy does not justify
a kangaroo court.‖49
Pulling back the curtain on the allegedly benevolent and
protective features of the courts, Justice Fortas declared that no
matter how ―euphemistic‖ the title of industrial school might be, it
was still akin to incarceration and sufficiently ―sentence‖-like to
require protections of due process before such commitment could be
imposed.50 Such protections included, at least, the right to notice of
the charges, right to confront the witnesses against you, and the
privilege against self-incrimination.51
In addressing petitioner Gault‘s right to counsel claim, Justice
Fortas took on the unique structure of juvenile courts, warning that
juvenile probation staff—who work to screen cases and gather intake
information—cannot serve as advocates for the youth.52 As law
enforcement officials who might be called to testify against the child,
they stand in legal conflict with them.53 The juvenile judge is
similarly conflicted as the fact-finder, and cannot be called upon to
protect the child‘s interests.54 Thus, the Court declared that the right
to counsel, as a juvenile, ―‗requires the guiding hand of counsel at
every step in the proceedings against him.‘‖55
Thus, about fifty years into the juvenile court movement, it
entered a new evolutionary phase, where the pendulum of informal
proceedings swung back toward more criminal-court-like processes
and features. Many youth advocates pressed for greater parallels with
adult prosecutions.56 Perhaps the greatest victory on this front from
the standpoint of juvenile defenders was the application of the proof
beyond the reasonable doubt standard to delinquency proceedings.57
49. Id. at 28.
50. Id. at 27.
51. Id. at 31–57. The Court left open the question of a child‘s right to a transcript and
appeal. See TANENHAUS, supra note 3, at 99.
52. Gault, 387 U.S. at 35–36.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 36.
55. Id. at 36–37.
56. See Tamar R. Birckhead, Toward a Theory of Procedural Justice for Juveniles, 57
BUFF. L. REV. 1447, 1456–62 (2009) (describing the movement to infuse juvenile court
proceedings with more procedural rights).
57. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
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Defenders were not the only ones seeking to infuse juvenile
prosecutions with more adult-like features. During what has been
dubbed the ―get tough‖ era of the 1970s to the 1990s, victims‘ rights
groups, law enforcement officials, conservative politicians, and
others again called for change to ensure more young people faced
criminal court certification and harsh adult sentences.58 Consistent
with this backlash against treating youth as special, the number of
teens in adult correctional facilities rose from sixteen hundred in
1988, to over nine thousand in 1997.59 And in some instances death
sentences were sought and imposed on teens.60
It was in the midst of the ―get tough‖ era that lawyers for youth
pressed the Court on one of the substantive issues left aside in Kent:
whether some child sentences are just too harsh to withstand Eighth
Amendment scrutiny. And in 1988, the Court considered whether a
sentence of death imposed against fifteen-year-old William Wayne
Thompson satisfied the ―evolving standards of decency‖ standard.61
Examining legislative provisions and the actions of juries in the
preceding forty years,62 as well as noting the less developed minds of
such young defendants,63 the Court determined that sentencing those
under sixteen years old to death was out of step with civilized norms
of a maturing society.64 However, the very next year, the Court
upheld the same sentence for two different teens, a sixteen-year-old
boy from Missouri, Heath Wilkins, and a seventeen-year-old
Kentucky teen, Kevin Stanford.65 Deciding that their sentences were
58. See, e.g., Barry C. Feld, Race, Politics, and Juvenile Justice: The Warren Court and
the Conservative „Backlash‟, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1447 (2003); Barry C. Feld, Unmitigated
Punishment: Adolescent Criminal Responsibility and LWOP Sentences, 10 J.L. FAM. STUD. 11,
68 (2007); see also Perry Moriarty & William Carson, Cognitive Warfare and Young Black
Males in America, 15 IOWA J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. (2012) (describing the 1990s ―superpredator war‖ against young men of color within the juvenile and criminal justice systems)
(forthcoming—draft on file with author).
59. See Moriarity & Carson, supra note 58.
60. See, e.g., Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988) (reviewing sentence of child
who, in 1984, had been sentenced to death for a crime committed when he was fifteen-yearsold).
61. Id. at 821–23.
62. Id. at 823–33.
63. Id. at 833–37.
64. Id. at 823.
65. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
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in line with modern understandings of decency, the Court declined to
extend the Eighth Amendment bar against imposition of the death
penalty for those between sixteen and eighteen years of age.66
It appears, however, that we have turned a page in the story of
juvenile justice in this country. Over the last decade, the Court has
revisited its thinking of child sentencing practices. Now, its
assessment is informed not only by legal considerations—like
statutory changes and jury findings—but social scientific evidence
that provides more concrete proof of the developmental concerns
hinted at by the Court in Thompson.
In 2005, in a case involving yet another Missouri child,
Christopher Simmons—perhaps suggesting that Missouri has been
one the harshest outliers in youth sentencing practices—the Supreme
Court finally ruled that executing anyone under eighteen violated the
Eighth Amendment as cruel and unusual.67 In Roper v. Simmons, the
Court again applied the evolving standards of decency doctrine,
finding that the tide had turned: Emerging morality—not only in this
country but internationally—abhors such treatment of children.68 In
what many consider a watershed moment in the evolving story of
juvenile justice in America, the Court held that youth are
categorically less culpable than adults.69 Given their still maturing
and developing brains, susceptibility to pressure from others, and
lack of strongly formed character traits, the traditional rationales for
sentencing fail to support the execution of anyone under eighteen.70
Taking this analysis to the next level, in 2010, the Court extended
Roper‘s analysis to youth serving sentences of life without parole
where they did not kill or intend to kill, noting that ―developments in
psychology and brain science continue to show fundamental
differences between juvenile and adult minds.‖71 For some, this was a
particularly noteworthy doctrinal shift as the Court applied the same
evolving standards of decency test that previously had been reserved
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id. at 380.
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 541 (2005).
Id. at 575.
Id. at 567.
Id. at 569.
Graham v. Florida, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010).
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for death penalty cases.72 The Court found that requiring youth to
spend the rest of their natural lives in prison—an extended period of
imprisonment when compared to sentences of most adults—was
especially harsh and warranted heightened scrutiny.73
And here is where the authors in this volume enter, into a story
still very much in progress. Their contributions seek to make greater
sense of this history, report on juvenile justice practices on the
ground, and offer theoretical and practical suggestions for youth
advocates and others in the days ahead.
In Juvenile Justice After Graham v. Florida: Keeping Due
Process, Autonomy, and Paternalism in Balance, Kristin Henning
helps us understand Graham‘s promise for youth and their advocates,
situating its ―categorically less culpable‖ framing within the larger
landscape of the history of juvenile justice philosophies. However,
like Tappan, she identifies pitfalls in creating a class of persons—or
nonpersons—who in all respects might be seen as incompetent,
warranting indiscriminate paternalistic interventions. She urges
careful thinking, contextualization, and nuance in applying the
teachings of Graham to ensure that we keep our potentially
competing commitments to legal rights, liberalism, and child
protection in check.
Picking up on the themes and warnings offered by commentators
at time of the juvenile court movement‘s second wave, Tamar R.
Birckhead shares her concerns about the modern juvenile justice
system in Delinquent by Reason of Poverty. Despite the
establishment of due process norms in Gault and emerging thinking
offered by cases like Graham, Birckhead suggests that for some
youth—particularly poor youth—juvenile court may still offer the
―worst of both worlds.‖74 In her rich and convincing account
Birckhead warns that in making elitist assumptions about the
meaning of poverty, today‘s justice courts may be unfairly ensnaring
72. See, e.g., Mary Berkheiser, Death is Not So Different Afterall: Graham v. Florida and
the Supreme Court‟s “Kids are Different” Jurisprudence, 36 VT. L. REV. 1 (2011); William W.
Berry III, More Different Than Life, Less Different Than Death, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 1109 (2010).
73. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2028.
74. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
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destitute youth, actually impeding their development and life
chances.
In J.D.B. and the Maturing of Juvenile Confession Suppression
Law, Martin Guggenheim and Randy Hertz provide an excellent
account of the unfolding of child interrogation law in the United
States—including the Supreme Court‘s recent decision in J.D.B. v.
North Carolina.75 J.D.B., they assert, may be ―a game changer in
delinquency and criminal cases involving minor suspects.‖
Analyzing how J.D.B. reflects a particularly noteworthy
(re)affirmation that ―kids are different,‖ Guggenheim and Hertz
argue that its application should work to change law enforcement
practices and require the provision of counsel to young people prior
to police questioning.
Lourdes Rosado‘s article, Outside the Police Station: Dealing
with the Potential for Self-Incrimination in Juvenile Court, takes us
below the reported-case radar to often doctrinally overlooked
situations where young people may be called upon within the
juvenile justice system to incriminate themselves. Rosado counsels
that these scenarios, usually set in the context of juvenile court‘s
rehabilitative features such as the intake interview and forensic
evaluations, call for both litigation and legislative attention. She
urges lawmakers to revise juvenile and evidence codes to protect
private and potentially inculpatory information that may be elicited
by system stakeholders with a view towards assisting accused youth.
And until then, she urges vigilance on the part of youth advocates,
calling on them to proactively protect against unnecessary
disclosures and challenge their affirmative use against
programmatically compliant clients.
Providing powerful pictures of continuing philosophic confusion
in the juvenile justice system, the final articles in this volume
spotlight systemic practices that may work to degrade and damage
young people. Yet, these day-to-day practices go largely unnoticed
by the law and lawyers. In Children in Chains: Indiscriminate
Shackling of Juveniles, Kim McLaurin offers the views of an
advocate who has worked to change laws and policies around court
75. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011).
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and correctional staff‘s use of hand and leg irons on children.
Providing a survey of various state laws that address the issue,
McLaurin concludes with some suggestions for reform, in part
drawing on her law clinic‘s success in helping to change the practice
of indiscriminate shackling in Massachusetts.
Finally, Sandra Simkins, with co-authors Dr. Marty Beyer and
Lisa M. Geis, tackle the issue of solitary confinement for children in
The Harmful Use of Isolation in Juvenile Facilities: The Need for
Post-Disposition Representation. Highlighting the importance of
post-dispositional representation on behalf of youth, they share the
accounts of young people encountered through the re-entry
representation work of Simkins‘s legal clinic—children who endured
the hardship of long-term confinement in isolation without access to
other youth, educational services, recreation, or outdoor time.
Simkins and her co-authors offer a call to action and strategies for
advocates seeking to end such practices.
These timely articles, and the related symposium for which this
volume is named, encourage us to continue the conversation about
these important topics and engage in further thoughtful and zealous
advocacy on behalf of, and with,76 juveniles in this country. They
also set the stage for the next part of our evolution—having looked
back on Gault‘s impact and considered the implications of Graham‘s
pronouncements, the thinking and sentiments shared may provide
clues about what lies ahead.
In fact, the week this symposium takes place and this volume is
released, the Supreme Court will hear arguments in Miller v.
Alabama and Jackson v. Hobbs, two cases that seek to clarify the
meaning of the Graham decision and extend its reasoning in the
cases of two boys—ages fourteen and fifteen—each of whom were
sentenced to life without parole for their roles in crimes that
ultimately resulted in the loss of life.77 Evolving standards of decency
76. This author is currently writing about some of the challenges of seeking to collaborate
with impacted youth—as compared to other client populations—to undertake systemic reform
efforts. See Mae C. Quinn, (Im)Mobilizing Youth (work in progress).
77. See Adam Liptak, Justices Will Hear Cases of 2 Life Sentences for Youths, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 8, 2011, at A15, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/08/us/supremecourt-will-hear-cases-of-life-sentences-for-youths.html; Legal Docket, Miller v. Alabama;
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in a maturing society surely suggest that sentencing youth to die
behind bars without the possibility of a second chance is a chapter in
our history that is ready to be closed. As was urged in 1898, we
should be done making criminals—forever condemned ones at that—
out of children.78
Jackson v. Hobbs, JUVENILE LAW CENTER, http://www.jlc.org/legal-docket/miller-v-alabamajackson-v-hobbs (last visited Jan. 31, 2012).
78. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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